Threat Tuesday – Mighty Midgets for the Short Guy in Pyongyang
OR so says the Chosun Ilbo:
South Korean patrol boats and corvettes are able to detect a mere 30 percent of submarines at a time when North Korea is increasing the frequency of submarine infiltration drills.
The article continues in typical Korean fashion; many statistics with little background. The problem with so many of the Korean numbers is there is no real basis or understanding the measurement. What is an “exercise?” Are they counting individual subs or days? For instance, if you have two subs out for two days, is it 2 exercises (2x subs), 4 exercises (2x subs x2 days) or what.
There is also a bit of intel “I’m telling you now so you can’t blame me latter” going on here:
This year’s submarine exercises in the West Sea were reportedly concentrated between June and August. “There’s a likelihood that the North will seek a chance for provocation as a lot of North Korean and Chinese fishing boats are busy in the West Sea during the blue crab harvest season” that began in early September, Shin said.
Take a look at the geography and oceanography of the Northwest Islands some time. Makes for a very interesting Harpoon scenario!
The definition of a midget submarine is also interesting. The NorKs have apparently been developing semi-submersible craft with torpedoes. This is part of the detection challenge the article alludes to.

Courtesy NOSINT.blogspot.com
Threat Tuesday – Confrontation at Sea
The official Chinese military website Jiefangjun Bao Online on 24 August published this picture of the Type 022 Houbei-class fast attack missile boat. The text that accompanies the picture – besides being written in poor English – does provide fodder for a wargame scenario.
Let’s break this down into some scenario-specific items:
- “The confrontation drill organized by a guided-missile speedboat detachment of the PLA Navy….” – other photos show a large formation of at least 10 boats so a detachment of that size is reasonable
- “Hardly did the mine-sweeping ships of the Red Side intrude into the mine matrix set up by the Blue Side when they suffered electronic disturbance caused by the latter.” – this is an anti-access scenario where the Blue Side is trying to sweep a minefield while the Red Side is trying disrupt that mission
- “Then the four new-type guided-missile speedboats of the Red Side rapidly conducted electronic counter-attack by way of roundabout communication, camouflaged intelligence and radio deception” – so even though the larger group of 10 boats was shown they operate in smaller units of possibly four boats; the reference to “roundabout communications” may indicate a use of other targeting data (shore-based?) and the “camouflaged intelligence and radio deception” may reference an ECM/ECCM or EMCON environment
- “[W]hich led to the failure of the Blue Side’s audio-visual equipment before launching fierce fire attack.” – the reference to AV equipment seemingly implies only a concern with the visual or near-visual (IR?) spectrum but the overall tone of the article definitely leaves one concerned about operations in a heavy ECM/ECCM environment.
So what we have is a scenario where the Blue Side is attempting to sweep a Red minefield which is being defended by 10 missile boats operating two to three smaller detachments supported by shore-based targeting in a heavy ECM/ECCM environment. Who will win? Sounds like a good Harpoon scenario in the making!